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ABSTRACT
This paper develops a generalized model for computing capacity by identifying the main
activities in a computer facility as formal transactions. The formal transactions carried out in
a computing environment are characterized along two dimensions: freqency of occurrence
and idiosyncrasy of assets. Vfe make recommendations as to how these formal transactons
should be executed - across markets, internally or using intermediate forms of governance.
It is shown that transactions in a computing facility fall into one of three categories: procure
ment of assets, maintenance and modification of assets, and collection, storage and process
ing of data into information. Formal transactions in a computing facility such as procurement
of application software, recruiting for different positions, data entry and transformation of
data into information are discussed in detail. The efficiency of possible forms of governance
is analyzed for each formal transaction. Generalized efficiency criteria for the market approach
versus managerial control are provided. The conclusions find an application in defining the
boundaries of end-user computing as well as other computing facilities such as data centers.

INTRODUCTION
One of the greatest challenges of business-oriented computing facilities is to increase per
sonal and organizational productivity while responding to the ever-changing business condi
tions. Most traditional computing facilities face difficulties that prevent them from providing
a fast service to the end user. These difficulties are seldom solved by placing com]auter resources
under the direct management of the end user.
In this paper we argue that one of the major causes for the traditional ineffiiciency of com
puter centers is vertical over-integration. We evaluate the degree to which a conrputing facility
should be vertically integrated. Activities in a data center such as procurement of application
software, recruiting, data entry, data processing and others, are viewed as generalized tran
sactions in the sense of the transaction cost economic theory. We identify and characterize
the formal transactions carried out in a computing environment along two dimensions, fre
quency of occurrence and idiosyncrasy of the investment under uncertainty. We recommend
ways in which these formal transactions can be efficiently executed - across markets, internal
ly, or using intermediate forms of governance. Our conclusions have a direct application in
defining the boundaries of end-user computing. We feel that greater flexibhit)'^ of computing
power can be achieved by employing economic principles of the transaction cost theory in
the process of organizing a computing facility.
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THE FRAMEWORK
Transaction cost economics is defined by Oliver Williamson (1979) as an "interdisciplinary
undertaking that joins economics with aspects of organization theory and overlaps extensive
ly with contract law." As Ronald Coase (1937) shows, markets and firms are alternative means
of completing a related set of transactions. Contracting out (the market approach) and
managerial authority represent two competing alternatives for organizing transactions. In this
setting, the firm presents itself as a set of contractual relationships. The ideal boundaries of
the firm are such that total transaction costs are minimized. We argue that the concept can
be extended to the departmental level, in this case a computing facility. Under competition,
the choice between markets and hierarchies is driven by efficiency, given that uncertainty of
outcome and opportimistic behavior increase the cost of using markets. Oliver Williamson
(1975) shows that bounded rationality (i.e., the inability to define aU futiure states in a transac
tional relation) and the tendency to opportunistic behavior (due to the small number of par
ties involved in an exchange) make costs of enforcing contracts eventually prohibitively high
and thus market governance to fail and be replaced by hierarchies. Later, Ian Macneil (1978)
and William Ouchi (1980) describe additional forms of governance and insist on the existence
of intermediate modes of organizing exchanges.
The most fruitful level of analysis of the vertical integration issue, is not the organization,
but the transaction (Barney and Ouchi, 1986). In order to establish the boundaries of an
organization, each transaction within the organization must be analyzed. Depending upon
the characteristics of the transactions, one can decide upon the most efficient way to carry
out the pertinent activities.

CHARACTERISTICS OF TRANSACTIONS
Three dimensions characterize a transaction: frequency of occurrence, the degree to which
an asset employed in the transaction (or the investment) is idiosyncratic and uncertainty of
outcome. Frequency of occurrence may be classified as occasional or recurring. Assets involv
ed in a transaction can be firm-specific, mixed and non firm-specific. In this paper we use
the terms firm-specific asset, idiosyncratic investment, and idiosyncratic asset interchangeably.
Idiosyncratic investments are in essence non-marketable investments. They occur in conjunc
tion with non-transferable, specialized designs. The third dimension, uncertainty, is always
present to a certain degree.

FORMS OF GOVERNANCE
Market governance uses as instrument the classical coritract, where identity of parties in
volved in the transaction is considered meaningless, the nature of the agreement is precisely
delimited and consequences of nonperformance fairly predictable from the very beginning
(Macneil, 1978). Trilateral governance, also known as neo-classical contracting, brings in third
party assistance to resolve possible disputes. Neo-classical contract law stems from the
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admittance that given the conditions of bounded rationality and opportunistic biehavior, there
is a need for both parties to trust the equity mecharusm in order to make the transaction work.
Bilateral governance steps in when two parties develop a long-term relationship maintained
by transaction specific economies. In that case, the relationship may become increasingly of
administrative type. Bilateral governance is fueled by hazardous reliance on market condi
tions and the possibility of recovering together specialized costs. Unified governance of the
exchange happens when the transaction is organized internally, as is the case of in-house ap
plication development. Vertical integration replaces the market mechanism with the ad
ministrative authority.

GENERALIZED MODEL FOR COMPUTING FACILITIES
Business computing facilities, ranging from computer centers to workstations, are in the
business of providing the end-user with information by executing a series of formal transac
tions and employing various assets. In developing a generalized model for computing capaci
ty, we construct on the work of Oliver Williamson (1979) who matches governance structures
to transactions. His system of classify transactions is described in Fig. 1.

Figure 1. The Williamson Framework: Matching Formal Transactions
with Governance Structures
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For transactions that involve non-specific assets, frequency of recurrence does not matter,
and market governance (classical contract) is recommended. The closer to air idiosyncratic
investment an occasional transaction requires, the more appropriate a trilateral governance.
Bilateral forms of governance are recommended for recurrent transactions that reiiuire customiz
ed assets and unified governance (pure verfical integration) is appropriate for recurrent tran
sactions utilizing highly idiosyncratic assets.
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The purer forms of governance, i.e., market and the unified structure are less sensitive
to uncertainty. Under pressure of uncertainty, bilateral governance tends to become a unified
structure. Some trilateral relationships evolve into market contracts by simplification of
transactions.
In our generalized model for computing capacity, we identify and analyze the assets first
and the transactions second. In a computing environment we distinguish four categories of
assets: data, hardware and system software, application software and human resources. The
data is the most perishable asset of all. Data can be firm non-specific (e.g., stock quotes) but
most often is a firm-specific asset. Hardware and system software, in most cases, are not
idiosyncratic investments. Sometimes, specialized equipment may be unique to the firm, like
certain data acquisition devices, but in general business computing hardware is a non-specific
asset to the firm.
A computing facility runs a portfolio of application software that has a fairly wide range
of firm specificity. Some of the applications are firm-specific to a great extent, other are in
dustry specific, while some others have a low degree of firm specificity. Among the latter are
financial systems. In general, we see firm specificity increase when going from Transaction
Processing Systems (TPS) to Structxured Decision Systems (SDS) and further to Decision Sup
port Systems (DSS) (Pieptea and Anderson, 1987).
Human resources in a computing environment cover a range of firm specificity, in many
cases related to the other assets that they are involved with. Listed in decreasing order of firm
specificity, human resources in the data center are the manager, the information analyst, the
system designer and the programmer. However, exceptions from this order exist: a maintenance
programmer assigned on a firm-specific peice of application software is closer to the firm than
a development programmer. We shall elaborate later on this idea.
Transactions executed in a computing facility fall into one of the three major categories:
(1) procurement of assets, (2) maintenance and modification of assets, and (3) collection,
storage and processing of data into information.
Procurement of hardware and system software is usually a non-recurring transaction in
volving non firm-specific assets. One may think of a very specialized piece of equipment to
be developed in house, but generally the business community goes to the market for executing
this type of transactions and thus, reality validates the model.
Procurement of application software is typically a set of non-recurring transactions involving
resotrrces of a wide range of firm specificity. Thus, according to the model, it makes more
sense to buy (or lease) a piece of financial software (low firm specificity) and have it installed
by a consulting firm rather than develop the software in house. On the other hand, internal
resources are better utilized in a highly idiosyncratic development effort. Here the model can
serve as a useful guide. Too many times software procurement is synonymous to software
development. At the other extreme, consulting firms are hired for what in essence is an openended project. In many cases, by reasonably simplifying requirements, one can find market
solutions to what looks like an internal development. Customization of packaged software
can be successfully accomplished using a long-term relationship (trilateral or bilateral form
of governance). Firm-specific application software should be developed internally (unified
governance).
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Procurement of human resources is, in general, an occasional transaction, unless there
is a severe turnover problem. Programming and system design staff is less firm specific than
information analysts and management personnel. We emphasize the programming function
since it presents the most diverse features. We distinguish the development programmer from
the maintenance programmer as two different positions. Because the line between the analysis
and programming in maintenance is quite fuzzy (most of the time assignments are a com
bination of business system analysis and coding), the maintenance programmer is in general
more firm-specific than the development programmer.
There are a number of alternative paths for procurement of human resources. The market
alternative is provided by personnel agencies (headhunters) and use of contractors while the
in-house path is represented by the use of the internal persormel department, piersonnel search
conducted at the MIS department level or providing data processing training to potential internal candidates. For the procurement of a maintenance programmer we recommend a long
time relationship with a placement agency. The development programmer on the other hand,
with stronger ties to the technology, is almost non firm-specific. This statement is validated
by the relatively high turnover rate of the more technical programming staff. For development
projects, with well defined specifications and timetable, contract programm(;rs offer a more
efficient alternative. The information system designer is technology specific tliough less than
the development programmer. The information analyst and the manager are firm-specific assets
and their development should be internally organized.
Maintenance and modification of hardware and system software should be and usually
is executed over the market (the maintenance contract). Note that extremely short time allow
ed to fbc potentially recurring problems (system crashes, certain on-line or real time system
failures) increase the idiosyncrasy to the point that it justifies the presence of a permanently
employed technical expert ("guru") on the premises. In many cases this person is known as
system programmer.
Maintenance and modification of non firm-specific applications is recommended to be
carried across markets or bilateral forms of governance. For example, the installation and light
customization of a new release of a market General Ledger product should be done with con
sultants. Too much customization of a packaged software product may create; important pro
blems. Once in production, the degree of firm specificity of an application changes. Because
of the urgency of production-related problems, application software maintenance is fit to be
organized internally. Highly specialized applications should be definitely maintained in house.
The model suggests that training for information management and analyst should be organized
internally, while training should be contracted out.
Data collection is most often a recurring process. It usually employs non-specific assets,
which is why many companies contract out their needs to external keying seirvices. If, on the
other hand, very specialized resources are needed, the data collection transaction is at home
within the boundaries of the organization. Since the data itself is a highly firm-specific asset,
its storage is a transaction that should be executed internally, rendering the maintenance of
the database an important departmental function.
Data processing, driven by the recurrence argument and the firm specifiicity of the data,
is to be carried out mostly in house. Occasional processing like disaster recovery planning
should be done and is eventually done over the market. On an application basis, those ap
plications that are non firm-specific could be eventually farmed out to service bureaus. Cap
turing the information on paper or screens shoudl be done internally and under proper security
measures.
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CONCLUSION
This paper approaches the different activities that take place in a computing environment
from the transaction cost economics point of view. We identify and characterize the formal
transactions in a computing organization along two dimensions, frequency of occurrence and
idiosyncrasy of the assets employed in the transaction, and study the impact of uncertainty.
We make recommendations as to how these formal transactions should be executed - across
markets, internally or using intermediate forms of governance. The following summarizes our
conclusions:
The end-user should be very selective in choosing what formal transactions related to com
puting he/she wants to bring under closer control. End-user computing stands a good chance
to be plagued by inefficiently run activities, if it assumes the responsibility of carrymg out
high cost transactions. Only firm-specific and/or highly firm-specific applications belong imder
close control of the end-user. One way to improve the service offered by traditional computing
facilities is to re-think operations in light of the transaction cost economics theory. Cost effi
ciency can be considerably improved if these principles are employed in the day-to-day prac
tice of data center management.
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